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EXPANSION OF NAFTA: ISSUES AND OBSTACLES REGARDING
ACCESSION BY LATIN AMERICAN STATES AND ASSOCIATIONS
Brandy A. Bayer*
I. INTRODUCTION
In December of 1994 the leaders of thirty-four nations of the Western
Hemisphere met at the Summit of the Americas. This conference resulted
in a unanimous call for the creation of a "Free Trade Area of the Americas"
(FTAA) by the year 2005. The decision to create the FTAA represents the
culmination of Latin America's move away from statism and protectionism
and toward free market principles. Evidence of this shift exists in the
execution of increasing numbers of multilateral and bilateral trade agree-
ments in Latin America in recent years. Former U.S. President George Bush
recognized and encouraged this trend when he announced the Enterprise for
the Americas Initiative (EAI) in 1990, which called for hemispheric free
trade, increased investment, and debt aid in Latin America.' From the point
of view of the United States, support for the FTAA is a continuation and
affirmation of the principles of the EAI.2
Current plans indicate that the FTAA will be built on "existing subregional
and bilateral arrangements in order to broaden and deepen hemispheric
economic integration and to bring the agreements together."3 The North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), to which the United States,
Canada and Mexico belong, is the newest such association. It is unprece-
* J.D. 1998, University of Georgia; B.A. 1995, Emory University.
'President's Remarks Announcing the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, 26 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 1009, 1010 (July 2, 1990).
2 David A. Pawlak, Learningfrom Computers: The Future of the Free Trade Area of the
Americas, 27 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 107, 119 (1995).
3 Ruperto Patino Manffer, The Future of Free Trade in the Americas, 10 CONN. J. INT'L
L. 639, 640 (1995) (quoting Summit of the Americas, Declarations of Principles infra note
64).
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dented in several ways-its size,4 its comprehensiveness, and its creation of
a free trade area among two developed countries and a developing country.'
NAFTA's measures include provisions covering trade in goods and services,
as well as investment, transportation, communications, border relations,
labor, and environment, taking it beyond the scope of traditional free trade
agreements.6
NAFTA is only one of many trade associations in the Americas, yet it is
likely to play an important role in hemispheric free trade,7 whether as one
of the subregional associations on which the FTAA is built or as the primary
method of its implementation. This is due both to the position of the United
States as a world leader in free trade and to the size of the NAFTA market.
Additionally, membership in NAFTA is an appealing prospect; it means,
among other things, gaining the benefits of increased investment and trade
with the lucrative U.S. market.'
In this context, the myriad of issues surrounding accession to
NAFTA-the criteria, the process, the method, the obstacles, and the
candidates-become important, both from the narrow perspective of current
and potential NAFTA members and from the broader perspective of
successful implementation of the FTAA.
4 When negotiations were completed in 1992, the NAFTA market consisted of
approximately 360 million consumers and $6 trillion in annual output. Pawlak, supra note
2, at 120.
' Id. at 121; most free trade agreements have been between countries at similar levels of
economic development, and there have been few successful cases of free trade agreements
solely between developing countries. GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & JEFFREY J. SCHOTT,
INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE: ISSUES AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 10 (1992).
6 SIDNEY WEINTRAUB, THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES,
NAFTA: WHAT COMES NEXT? 2 (1994); traditionally, free trade agreements have sought
only the circulation of products across frontiers with zero tariffs and non-tariff barriers. Ana
Maria De Aguinis, Can MERCOSUR Accede To NAFTA? A Legal Perspective, 10 CONN. J.
INT'L L. 597, 633 (1995).
7 Paul A. O'Hop, Jr., Hemispheric Integration and the Elimination of Legal Obstacles
Under a NAFTA-Based System, 36 HARV. INT'L L.J. 127, 128 (1995).
' David L. Markus, Latin American Nations Hop on Free-Trade Bandwagon, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Nov. 19, 1993, at 13D.
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Economic Integration in Latin America
NAFTA is not the first economic association formed in the Americas;
Latin America countries have pursued economic integration since World War
II. The United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America spurred
early attempts at regional and subregional integration.9 However, this trend
faltered in the late 1960s and early 1970s, as the rise of nationalistic
totalitarian regimes curtailed the functioning of democratic free-market
systems.'0 In the 1980s, democracy and free-market principles returned to
much of Latin America, bringing with them the renewal of attempts at
economic integration. "
1. Regional Integration
The Latin America Integration Association (LAIA)"2 is the successor of
the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA), which faltered in the
1970s.' 3  Established in 1980, the LAIA has created a framework for
negotiating bilateral trade accords that can be progressively
multilateralized, 4 furthering the goal of a "gradual and progressive
formation of a Latin American common market."' 5
The Organization of American States (OAS), formed after World War II
to further regional security interests, amended its Charter in 1967 to make
the promotion of integration an express objective. 16  After waning in
9O'Hop, supra note 7, at 130-3 1.
'
0 Id. at 131.
"Id. at 132.
2 LAIA consists of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Columbia, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico,
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. Id. at n.37.
13 Pawlak, supra note 2, at 118-19. The LAIA has embraced more realistic expectations
than those of LAFTA, including no specific deadline for the creation of a common market and
provisions for a wider variety of agreements. Id. at 119-120.
'4 Pawlak, supra note 2, at 119.
IS O'Hop, supra note 7, at 133-34 (quoting Treaty of Montevideo Establishing the Latin
American Integration Association, Aug. 12, 1980, 20 I.L.M. 672).
1' Id. at 135-36. The amendment states that the member states "shall orient their efforts
and take the necessary measures to accelerate the integration process, with a view to
establishing a Latin American common market in the shortest possible time." Id. at n.52
(quotingTreaty of Montevideo Establishing the Latin American Integration Association, Aug.
1997]
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importance in the 1960s and 70s, in the 1980s the OAS reasserted its
influence by creating a role for itself in furthering integration and free trade
in the region.
17
2. Subregional Integration
The Southern Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR), composed of
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay,18 is one of the newest and most
successful subregional agreements. 9 MERCOSUR was founded on free-
market principles, with the goal of establishing a common market among its
members.2" The economic integration of MERCOSUR has bought about
a tremendous reduction in tariffs and a corresponding increase in intra-group
trade.21 In contrast to MERCOSUR, the Andean Pact22 was founded on
a centrally planned model of development.23 After years of problems and
delays, in the late 1980s the Pact began a shift to an outlook favoring trade
liberalization and progress toward a single market.24
The oldest subregional agreement in Latin America is the Central
American Common Market (CACM).25 Successful in its early years, it
ceased to function in 1969 when hostilities broke out between El Salvador
and Honduras.26 In 1984 the members revived CACM and its process of
economic integration, and in 1993 three members, El Salvador, Guatemala,
and Honduras, formed a customs union.27 The Caribbean subregion formed
12, 1980, 20 I.L.M. 672).17 Id. at 136.
s On October 1, 1996, Chile became an associate member of MERCOSUR. NAFTA
Round-Up: Chile Officially Joins MERCOSUR, LATIN AMERICAN LAW AND BUSINESS
REPORT, Oct. 31, 1996.
' O'Hop, supra note 7, at 143.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 144.
22 The original members were Chile, Columbia, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Peru; however,
Chile withdrew in 1976 because the group was contrary to the more liberal economic policies
it had pursued in recent years. Id. at 140, 142.23 Id. at 141.
24 Id. at 142-43.
25 Id. at 138. The members are Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and
Nicaragua. Id.26 Id. at 139.
27 Id. at 140.
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the Caribbean Community (CARICOM)" in 1973.29 All the members
except for the Bahamas committed to forming a common market, a process
which was hindered by severe economic problems in the region during the
1970s and 1980s. In 1989, however, CARICOM renewed efforts to
complete the common market.30
B. NAFTA
1. United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement
Even before the implementation of a free trade agreement, the United
States and Canada had carried on the largest reciprocal trade between two
nations in the world. 3' After several years of discussions on pursuing freer
trade, followed by several more years of negotiations, 32 on January 1, 1989
the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement,33 the largest trade
agreement ever concluded between two countries, was implemented.34 It
was designed to (1) provide greater market access (2) provide more secure
market access and (3) allow market forces to operate freely. 35 These goals
were pursued through numerous detailed provisions of the FTA.
The Canada-United States FTA represented the first comprehensive
international economic agreement in which the parties set up a mutually
28 CARICOM consists of Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica,
Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines,
and Trinidad and Tobago. Id. at n.124.
29 Id. at 145.
30 Id. at 146.
31 Susan A. Hebditch, Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, in MANAGING THE
PRIVATE LAW LIBRARY 1991: MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES, NEW TECHNOLOGY, AND
PLANNING FOR THE 1990s, 313 P.L.I./Pat. 379, 381 (1991) (PLI Patents, Copyrights,
Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. G4-3862, April-May, 1991).
Over the past decade, approximately 75% of Canada's total exports were destined for the
United States while 23% of the United States' were delivered to Canada; the United States
received approximately 25% of its imports from Canada and Canada 66% of its imports from
the United States. Id.32 Id. at 393-98.
33 The agreement is known alternatively as the "Canada-United States FTA or the "United
States-Canada" FTA and does not have a widely agreed upon acronym.
3" Hebditch, supra note 31, at 381-82.
35 James R. Holbein, The Case for Free Trade, 15 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 19, 21
(1992).
1997]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
agreed-upon legal framework covering not only trade in merchandise, but
also financial services, government procurements, agriculture, telecommuni-
cations services, business travel, investment and other issues.36 Some of the
most important provisions included the elimination of all tariffs over a ten
year period, reduction or elimination of non-tariff barriers, and improved
customs procedures and rules of origin to ensure the benefits of the
agreement accrued only to the United States and Canada.37 Additionally,
the world's first comprehensive trade in services agreement embodied the
principles of national treatment (non-discrimination), the right of establish-
ment, transparency, and the right to sell across borders.38
2. Creation of the North American Free Trade Agreement
In 1990, President Salinas de Gortari of Mexico and President Bush of the
United States announced that they had agreed in principle to the idea of a
comprehensive free trade agreement between their two countries. 9 The
impetus for a free trade agreement at that time was the process of reform
pursued by Mexico over the preceding years. In 1986, Mexico joined the
General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),4" thereby committing
publicly to the principle of free trade. Over the next several years it reduced
tariffs, which were once as high as 100%, to a maximum of 20%, revamped
investment regulations to create a business climate more conducive to foreign
investment, enacted intellectual property rights laws, and initiated privatiza-
tion of government-owned enterprises.4
These and other reforms placed Mexico in a position to benefit from a free
trade agreement through economic growth, increased trade and investment,
more jobs, lower prices, and greater competitiveness; 42 they also gave the
United States the opportunity to further its strong interest in promoting
36 Hebditch, supra note 31, at 382.
5 Holbein, supra note 35, at 21-23.
38 Id. at 22.
39Michael W. Gordon, Some ObservationsAbout the NAFTA, 7 FLA. J. INT'L L. 363, 367
(1992).
40 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade is multilateral trade negotiations that have
occurred since after World War II in successive rounds. The most recent negotiations, the
Uruguay Round, involved 108 countries representing over 90% of total world trade. Holbein,
supra note 35, at 30.
41 Id. at 24.
42 Id. at 25.
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economic growth, political stability, and progress toward greater democracy
in Mexico.43 The commitment by Mexico to a free trade agreement would
help lock in the important domestic reforms instituted while convincing
Mexico's other potential trading partners that the favorable climate for trade
and investment could not be easily reversed."
The initial intent of the parties was to negotiate a bilateral free trade
agreement between Mexico and the United States.45 However, shortly after
the announcement of the proposed negotiations, in January 1991, Canada
made a formal request to join the negotiations." Canadian-Mexican trade
is only a fraction of United States-Mexican trade,47 and although Canadian-
Mexican trade would probably increase more with a free trade agreement
than without one, freer access to the Mexican market would not have a
substantial impact on the Canadian economy." Canada's primary interests
in participating in NAFTA were protecting gains won in the Canada-United
States FTA49 and being a part of whatever larger gains may come from a
continent-wide free market.5 ° The primary objection to Canadian participa-
tion was that it would slow down the negotiations and delay the conclusion
of the agreement."
On February 5, 1991, the presidents of the United States and Mexico and
the prime minister of Canada announced their intention to conclude a North
American Free Trade Agreement 2.5  The broad goals of the negotiations
were essentially the same as for the Canada-United States FTA-(l) greater
market access (2) more secure market access and (3) allowing market forces
to work. 3 Therefore, the negotiators used the Canada-United States FTA
as a reference and a model, and many of the provisions of NAFTA were
41 HUFBAUER & SCHOTT, supra note 5.
44Id. at 16.
45Gordon, supra note 39, at 367.
46 Id.
47 Trade between Mexico and the United States was approximately $60 billion annually,
while trade between Mexico and Canada was only about $2.5 billion annually. Id.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 367-68.
'o Richard Alm, Three's Company: Canada Likely to Join in US.-Mexico Free-trade
Talks, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 26, 1990.
SI Gordon, supra note 39.
52 Holbein, supra note 35, at 23.
'3 Id. at 25.
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copied or adapted from the FTA.54 When NAFTA came into effect on
January 1, 1994, the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement was
transformed into and superseded by NAFTA.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Mandate for the FTAA
1. Enterprise for the Americas Initiative
The movement toward expansion of NAFTA can be traced to June 27,
1990 and the announcement by U.S. President Bush of the Enterprise for the
Americas Initiative (EAI). Designed to support Latin American countries in
their efforts to carry out economic reforms and international trade and
investment liberalization, 55 the EAI spurred the creation of NAFTA and
encouraged the trend of free trade in the Americas, within regional
agreements and with the United States.56
The EAI consisted of three pillars: (1) reduction of trade barriers (2)
increased investment in the region and (3) debt relief.5 7 In regards to the
first pillar, President Bush stated
[W]e must build on the trend we see toward free markets
and make our ultimate aim a free trade system that links all
of the Americas: North, Central, and South. And we look
forward to the day when not only are the Americas the first
fully free, democratic hemisphere but when all are equal
partners in a free trade zone stretching from the port of
Anchorage to the Tierra del Fuego. I'm announcing today
that the U.S. stands ready to enter into free trade agreements
with other markets in Latin America and the Caribbean,
particularly with groups of countries that have associated for
purposes of trade liberalization. 8
5 Pawlak, supra note 2, at 121.
SS Holbein, supra note 35, at 27.
56 O'Hop, supra note 7, at 149-50.
17 Id. at 149.
58President's Remarks Announcing the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, supra note
1, at 1011.
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The immediate effect of the EAI was the conclusion of fifteen framework
agreements with thirty countries 9 and the formation of NAFTA;60 the
long-term effects are still being realized.
2. Summit of the Americas
The initiatives begun by President Bush were strengthened and solidified
in December 1994 at the Summit of the Americas.6 At the Summit, the
leaders of the region's thirty-four democracies committed to the establish-
ment of an FTAA, or Free Trade Area of the Americas, by the year 2005.62
The FTAA, which would constitute the largest free trade zone in the world,
encompassing 850 million people with $13 trillion in purchasing power,63
would be created by "build[ing] on existing subregional and bilateral
arrangements in order to broaden and deepen hemispheric economic
integration and to bring the agreements together.
64
To ensure that concrete action occurs, the participants established an
agenda of activities centered around meetings of trade ministers. 65  The
focus of these meetings is how to make five major trade agreements 66
compatible.67 At the first such meeting, in June 1995, the ministers created
working groups to examine specific issues relating to negotiations of the
FTAA; these issues included market access, investment, standards and
technical barriers to trade, and the effect of integration on the region's
smaller economies. 68  At the second meeting, in March 1996, the trade
9 Holbein, supra note 35, at 28.
60 O'Hop, supra note 7, at 150.
61 The second Summit of the Americas is set for April, 1998, in Chile, where formal
negotiations to create a FTAA are expected to be launched. Chile hot for NAFTA expansion
but examining bilateral options..., AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Sept. 17, 1997.
62 Pawlak, supra note 2, at 123.
63 Helene Cooper & Jose de Cordoba, Chile is Invited to Join NAFTA as US. Pledges
Free-Trade Zone for Americas, WALL STREET JOURNAL, Dec. 12, 1994, at A3.
64 Summit of the Americas, Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action, Dec. 11, 1994,
34 I.L.M. 808, 811.
65 Manffer, supra note 3, at 641.
66 The five major agreements are NAFTA, MERCOSUR, CARICOM, CACM, and the
Andean Pact.
67 Cooper, supra note 63.
68 Regional Trade MinistersReview Progress in Construction of Hemispheric Free Trade
Area, CHRONICLE OF LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, Mar. 28, 1996, available in
Westlaw, 1996 WL 7980191.
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ministers authorized the creation of additional working groups covering
competition, government procurements, trade in services, intellectual
property rights, and dispute-resolution mechanisms. 69 The third and fourth
meetings were scheduled for 1997 in Brazil and 1998 in Costa Rica.7°
From the outset many of the nations involved, and especially the United
States, considered the expansion of NAFTA as one of the primary instru-
ments to be used in the creation of the FTAA.71 At the press conference
following the Summit, U.S. President Clinton stated that "the accord that we
announce today is additional proof of our intentions, serious intentions, to
complete NAFTA for all of the Americas by the year 2005. "72 The
alternative approach, which has been gaining more support,7 3 is to weave
the FTAA together from strengthened and broadened subregional trade
agreements.7" Even under this method, the expansion of NAFTA will play
an important part in the creation of the FTAA in its role as one of the most
important and powerful of the subregional trade agreements.
B. Accession to NAFTA
1. Accession Clause
The text of NAFTA allows for the possibility of accession, but gives few
concrete guidelines for the procedure to be followed. Article 2204 states
1. Any country or group of countries may accede to this
Agreement subject to such terms and conditions as may be
agreed between such country or countries and the Commis-
sion and following approval in accordance with the applica-
ble legal procedures of each country. 2. This Agreement
shall not apply as between any Party and any acceding
69 Id.
70 Jeannette M.E. Tramhel, Free Trade in the Americas: A Perspective from the
Organization of American States, 19 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 595, 607 (1997).
71 O'Hop, supra note 7, at 151.
72 Manffer, supra note 3, at 643.
7' At the second meeting of the regional trade ministers, all the delegations expressed
support for the multilateral approach, given that a strategy based solely on expansion of
NAFTA would be extremely slow and tedious. Regional Trade Ministers Review Progress
in Construction of Hemispheric Free Trade Area, supra note 68.
74 Id.
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country or group of countries if, at the time of accession,
either does not consent to such application.75
2. Procedure for Accession
The general procedure for accession involves three steps-a formal
invitation by the members of NAFTA to begin accession negotiations,
negotiations between the applying county and representatives of the NAFTA
members, and approval of the completed agreement by the three member
countries and the acceding country. The first two steps are ad hoc in nature;
the NAFTA members decide when and how to extend a formal invitation,
after which they and the invitee agree on the logistics of the negotiations.
The third step, however, must follow the domestic laws of each state.
In Mexico, international agreements must be ratified by a two-thirds
majority of the Mexican Senate, and the implementing legislation must be
approved by the Mexican Senate and the House of Deputies.76 In Canada,
the agreement must first be approved by the Canadian Cabinet, then be
introduced into the Canadian House of Commons and follow the normal
parliamentary process in the Canadian House and Senate.77
In the United States, accession requires Congressional approval and the
passage of implementing legislation.7 8  Under section 108(b) of the
legislation implementing NAFTA, by May 1, 1994, and again by May 1,
1997, the U.S. Trade Representative is required to submit a report to the
President and the Ways and Means and Finance Committees of the
Congress.7 9 This report lists the countries that either (1) currently provide
fair and equitable market access to U.S. exports, or (2) have made significant
progress in opening their markets to U.S. exports, and the further opening
of whose markets has the greatest potential to increase U.S. exports.8" The
President must then report to the committees on the countries with which the
United States should seek to negotiate free trade agreements and the
objectives for such negotiations.8
's North American Free Trade Agreement, 32 I.L.M. 605, 702 (1993).
76 Dean C. Alexander, The North American Free Trade Agreement: An Overview, I 1
INT'L TAX & Bus. LAW. 48, 52 (1993).
77 Id.
7' North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, 1993 WL 561124
(N.A.F.T.A.), 3.
79 Id. at 10.
go Id.
81 id.
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An important feature of U.S. Congressional approval of international
agreements generally is the "fast-track" procedure. Under this procedure,
prior to the start of negotiations the Congress gives the President "fast-track"
negotiating authority. When the agreement is completed and comes before
Congress for consideration, Congress cannot amend any part of it, but can
only approve or defeat the entire agreement.82 Although this authority is
not required for the completion of a trade agreement, the lack of it
significantly hinders both the negotiation and the approval of such agree-
ments.8 3
3. Criteria for Accession
Article 2204 of NAFTA also does not prescribe the substantive criteria
that a country must meet in order to accede. The requirements, however, are
to be economic and non-economic criteria developed by the governments of
the United States, Canada, and Mexico.84 The members of NAFTA have
yet to put forth any official, specific requirements for accession, and a
continuing lack of clear guidelines for accession complicates any expansion
of NAFTA."5
Although the criteria have never been officially announced, some generally
recognized standards were articulated in the EAI as "indicators of readi-
ness"--(1) the economic and institutional capacity to fulfill long-term,
serious commitments, (2) a stable macroeconomic environment and market-
oriented policies, (3) progress in achieving open trade regimes, and (4)
membership in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 6
More recently, protection of intellectual property and investment has gained
importance as a generally recognized requirement for admission into
NAFTA.8
7
82 Cooper, supra note 63.
13 Finlay Lewis, Events Make Chile's Admission to NAFTA a Tough Sell, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIBUNE, May 2, 1995, at C1.
84 O'Hop, supra note 7, at 152.
8 Ild. at 151.
86 Pawlak, supra note 2, at 120.
s Stephen Fidler & George Graham, Summit of the Americas: Chile to Move Soon
Towards NAFTA, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1994.
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IV. ANALYSIS
A. Method of Accession
With the confirmation at the Summit of the Americas of a solid commit-
ment by the democracies of Latin America to a FTAA, the issues surround-
ing accession to NAFTA cease to be matters of theory and become matters
of practical concern. NAFTA should occupy a substantial role in the
creation of a FTAA, due both to its strength and size among existing Latin
American trade agreements and to its role as an instrument of U.S. trade
policy in Latin America. Given that the plan of action calls for the
completion of the FTAA by 2005, any expansion of NAFTA may involve
multiple country, successive accessions.
Accession of multiple countries to NAFTA will probably take one of two
forms or a combination of both. The first approach is individual, or
"piecemeal," accession," in which each country negotiates one at a time for
admission to NAFTA after it meets the accession criteria.89 The second
approach is bloc, or "cluster," accession, in which an existing subregional
association negotiates for accession to NAFTA as a group.9" Both methods
have their own advantages and disadvantages, and which method is
appropriate may depend on the particular circumstances of accession.
1. Individual Accession
a. Advantages
Individual accession should almost certainly be pursued with countries that
do not belong to any subregional associations. 9' For countries that meet the
accession criteria on their own, lack of participation in an integration
agreement should not prevent membership in NAFTA. However, individual
accession has advantages as a wider policy as well. These include the
benefits of one-on-one negotiations and the encouragement of trade
liberalization by rewarding the most successful countries.
88 Frank J. Garcia, NAFTA and the Creation of the FTAA: A Critique of Piecemeal
Accession, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 539, 549 (1995).
'9 O'Hop, supra note 7, at 153.
90 Id.
91 Id.
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United States policy has long been to advocate democracy and free trade
in Latin America.92 Inviting a country to join NAFTA is a recognition of
the progress which that country has made in developing democratic
principles, free-market policies and trade liberalization; it is also a way to
"lock-in" these achievements by giving them the status of treaty obliga-
tions.93 Accession to NAFTA means increased foreign investment,94 better
efficiency due to more competition, opportunities for greater specialization,
and access to new technologies.95 For a country making the transition to
free markets and free trade, gaining access to the NAFTA market can have
a significant positive effect on the growth rate of its economy and on the
overall welfare of the state;96 these benefits have the effect of "locking-in"
the democratic, free-market, and free trade policies.
Another advantage individual accession has over bloc accession is easier,
simpler negotiations for membership. Instead of attempting to negotiate one
agreement with multiple countries which, in addition to coming to the table
with differing levels of development and differing internal problems, may
frequently disagree among themselves, NAFTA will be negotiating with a
single country.97 This allows the negotiations to focus on an individual
country's strengths and weaknesses and any country-specific concerns.
b. Disadvantages
There are, however, real disadvantages to allowing individual accession
by members of subregional associations. The greatest drawback to this
approach is the harm it will inflict on existing subregional organizations and
their members.98 When a member of one of these associations accedes
individually to NAFTA, that country will gain access to the benefits of the
NAFTA market while the remainder of the group will be denied that
access. 99 These countries will not see the increased investment, efficiency,
and competition that the new NAFTA member will experience.'
92 Garcia, supra note 88, at 583.
93 Id. at 581-82.
94 Increased investment is an important factor in productivity growth and is considered key
to any expansion of intraregional and export trade. Id. at 567-68.
9' Id. at 565.
96 id.
97 O'Hop, supra note 7, at 153.
98 Garcia, supra note 88, at 550.
99 Id. at 562.
'0o Id. at 565-66.
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This situation may fundamentally alter the economic bases for establishing
the association by strengthening the new NAFTA member while compara-
tively weakening the remaining members of the group.'0 ' The accession
of one member could reinforce any existing asymmetries and fundamentally
skew economic relations and development within the association in favor of
the acceder because of its increased access to markets and investment. 2
The results of this asymmetry may destroy the subregional agreement
altogether, 10 3 and with it the basis of the FTAA, the building on and
strengthening of existing trade agreements.' 4 In addition, the changes in
compatibility and levels of development within a group could lead to
political and economic tensions that would hamper regional trade liberaliza-
tion, potentially causing trade wars and new protectionist measures within the
association that could disrupt local economic development and damage the
prospects for regional and hemispheric free trade."0 5
A less monumental but perhaps more practical disadvantage of individual
accession is the cumulative burden of a series of individual negotiations.
Negotiating with each successie new member will be time-consuming,
expensive, and repetitive; for instance, in the United States, it will mean
requesting "fast-track" authority for each new accession. 6 Under this
method of accession, reaching a FTAA by 2005 becomes all the more
unlikely.
2. Bloc Accession
a. Advantages
Bloc accession to NAFTA by subregional groups has several advantages
over individual accession, particularly given the increasing growth and
success of such associations in Latin America. The first advantage is that
bloc accession will encourage the strengthening of subregional groups
10 Id. at 572-73.
'2Id. at 573.
103 The need for a balanced distribution of economic development within associations is
a recognized aspect of integration in underdeveloped regions generally and in Latin America
specifically. Id. at 572.
4 Id. at 574; see also WEINTRAUB, supra note 6, at 98-99 (describing specific situations
where individual accession would weaken or destroy subregional groups).
1o5 Garcia, supra note 88, at 573.
'o O'Hop, supra note 7, at 153.
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through increased cooperation among their members. Under bloc accession,
no member will accede until the group as a whole meets the admission
criteria. This makes participation in the regional economy a necessity for
admission and creates a powerful incentive for each member to support and
enhance the growth and development of its partners, so that all will meet the
criteria sooner."0 7 The immediate result is a stronger and more successful
subregional association; the more long-term result is sustainable economic
growth and development throughout the region."18
A second but related advantage of bloc accession to NAFTA is its
encouragement of more rapid progress toward free trade in the region as a
whole. The existing subregional associations represent one of the most
fundamental components of the region's movement toward trade liberaliza-
tion,0 9 and continued development of these associations can make the
members more efficient and more competitive in the region and in the world
economy."0 Furthermore, countries which take serious, long-term steps
toward trade liberalization in the context of a subregional association are
providing strong evidence of their commitment to economic reform and their
ability to meet NAFTA admission criteria."'
Additionally, bloc accession to NAFTA offers several advantages in the
process of negotiations for admission. First, it reduces the number of times
the process must occur for real expansion to take place. Negotiations are
time-consuming and expensive, but under bloc accession they will be less
repetitive and a more efficient use of resources.1 2 Also, fewer rounds of
negotiations means fewer rounds of accession. Each time a country joins the
NAFTA market, it causes a shift in trade patterns and economic production;
bloc accession will facilitate this adjustment process by reducing the number
of these dislocations."' Finally, bloc accession to NAFTA will reduce the
number of negotiating partners for the FTAA, which could speed up the
creation and implementation of hemispheric free trade."'
107 Garcia, supra note 88, at 586.
'"Id. at 585.
'09 Id. at 575.
" ld. at 575-76.
' Id. at 576; Mexico, for instance, could not have joined NAFTA without first
undertaking serious reforms and economic restructuring. Id.
2 O'Hop, supra note 7, at 153.
11 Garcia, supra note 88, at 578-79.
114 Id. at 580.
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b. Disadvantages
Like individual accession, the bloc accession approach does have some
disadvantages. The most important one is that it could delay the progress of
the best performing countries in favor of waiting on the less developed
countries. A country that has made considerable advances in trade
liberalization and market reforms will be denied the benefits of access to the
NAFTA market until its association partners have made similar progress." 5
For a country striving to modernize and liberalize its economy, this delay
could be politically and economically damaging. Under the "locking-in"
theory, delaying accession for such a country increases the risk that the
progress made by the country will be lost." 6
Additionally, bloc accession brings its own difficulties to the negotiation
process. While it is true that fewer rounds of negotiations will need to take
place, each round will be cumbersome and complicated. These problems
will be amplified if the group negotiating for accession proves incapable of
pursuing unified policies and actions." 7  The existing subregional
associations have displayed varying levels of unity;... groups composed of
economically strong and independent states with divergent economic
viewpoints are less likely to present a united front in such important
negotiations."' A breakdown in unity within a group during negotiations
stands to hopelessly complicate those negotiations and threaten their
successful completion.
B. Obstacles to Accession
Regardless of what form accession takes, it will not be just a simple
matter of invitation, negotiation, and accession. There are significant
obstacles to accession to NAFTA, both procedural and practical. The
existence of numerous subregional associations and several overarching
regional organizations creates a myriad of memberships, rules, and
I151d. at 586.
116 Id. at 583.
... O'Hop, supra note 7, at 153.
.. Both CARICOM and CACM have demonstrated a measure of unity by successfully
concluding trade agreements with third countries. Id.
119 Id.
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obligations that complicate the accession process. 2 ' Even if the procedural
issues are resolved, political considerations are intruding on plans for
expansion of NAFTA, both in the United States, Mexico, and potential new
members.
1. Problems of Multiple-Group Membership
a. Legal obstacles
Countries wishing to accede to NAFTA that already belong to an
association may face legal obstacles to that accession deriving from their pre-
existing group membership.' 2 ' An example of these obstacles occurred
when Mexico joined NAFTA. Mexico is a member of the LAIA, which
requires that members give "most favored nation" treatment to all members;
the result of this would be that all other LAIA members would receive the
trade benefits of NAFTA through Mexico. Mexico attempted to work its
way out of this rule; through diplomatic maneuvering the potential crisis was
postponed but not resolved, as Mexico was granted a five-year excep-
tion.'22
If accession is by group, the potential legal obstacles are reduced, although
problems with broader regional organizations such as those of Mexico are
still possible. In addition, the individual countries of the acceding group
must still have a clear legal basis for accession to NAFTA in their domestic
law, such as a constitutional authority for direct accession or the capability
and constitutional authority to designate NAFTA as the direct legal successor
to the association. 2
3
b. Merging Separate Organizational and Institutional Structures
Another major obstacle to bloc accession is the practical and legal
difficulties involved in merging two separate organizational structures. Each
association possesses its own institutions, differing in both authority and
'20 O'Hop, supra note 7, at 157.
121 Id.
122 Mexico wanted a permissive interpretation of the LAIA treaty that allowed it refrain
from giving "most favored nation" treatment; however, its request failed, due largely to
Brazil's adamant opposition. Id. at 157-58.
121Id. at 159.
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scope.'24 Resolving the institutional conflicts of accession can occur in
one of two ways. Accession by an association can trigger the dissolving of
the entire institutional structure of the acceding group; in effect, the
association is absorbed completely into NAFTA and ceases to exist. 25
Alternatively, at least some of the institutional structure of the acceding
group can be set up within the NAFTA structure.'26 This would require
the development of clear rules as to representation and both the chain and
scope of authority and would greatly complicate the NAFTA governing
structure;' 27 however, in some cases it may be the most practical way to
accomplish a group accession.
c. Overlapping and Competing Provisions
If a country accedes individually, it may be forced to withdraw from any
other association of which it is a member. 28 If it is able to remain a
member of both groups, several practical problems may arise. One such
problem is the uncertainty caused by overlapping provisions. NAFTA and
the other association are unlikely to have identical provisions covering many
details of trade. Both private corporations and countries attempting to
conduct business or engage in trade with the acceding country will face
uncertainty about what rules apply in what situations, which will likely lead
to numerous conflicts and may partially defeat the trade and investment-
increasing benefits of accession to NAFTA.'29
d. Group Preferences
One of the thorniest of these uncertainty problems is the process of
determining what goods receive group preferences. The NAFTA rules of
origin 30 are complicated and detailed; so too are those of most other trade
agreements. The administrative burden of complying with two separate
124Id. at 162.
125 O'Hop, supra note 7, at 162.
126 Id.
"'7Id. at 162-63.
121Id. at 158.
129 Garcia, supra note 88, at 580.
"' Rules of origin set guidelines regarding place and content of production of goods for
determination of whether the goods originated in a member country. Id.
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origin schemes will hinder legitimate trade while increasing the ability of
others to circumvent the rules and gain access to the NAFTA market.'
2. Political Obstacles
a. United States
Accession to NAFTA by any country or bloc will not occur without the
political will of the United States, NAFTA's most powerful member. The
U.S. support for free trade has been strong for many years, support which
provided the impetus for the creation of NAFTA and the commitment to a
FTAA. However, since 1994, the enthusiasm by the United States for
expansion of NAFTA has waned considerably.'32 Several events have
helped cause this dearth of enthusiasm.
The creation of NAFTA in the first place sparked controversy in the
United States, due largely to Mexico's status as a less developed country.
Worries about job displacement and abuse of the environment clouded the
1992 U.S. Presidential campaign, and implementation of NAFTA only
occurred after a bruising public relations and political fight.' Once
approval of NAFTA was finally won, the Mexican peso collapsed at the end
of 1994, endangering U.S. investments'34 and sending the Mexican
economy into deep recession. Although data and analysis dispute it, public
perception was that NAFTA was at least partly responsible for the peso
crisis.'
In 1996, a U.S. Presidential election year, these events, combined with
budget battles and overriding domestic issues, made the issue of expansion
of NAFTA a hot potato-no one wanted to touch it.'36 Despite the re-
election of President Clinton, who supports NAFTA expansion, political
opposition and disagreement as to the proper role of labor and environmental
.31 Other members of the subregional association to which the acceding country belongs
have preferential access to the acceding country's market; they can use this access as a way
in to the NAFTA market. Id. at 580-81.
132 Roberta Maynard, At a Crossroads in Latin America, NATION'S BUs., Apr. 1, 1996,
available in Westlaw, 1996 WL 8505687.
"' Trade is Centerpiece but LA Policy Remains on Hold Until Next Year, LAGNIAPPE
LETTER, May 10, 1996, available in Westlaw, 1996 WL 8394722.
14 Lewis, supra note 83.
135 Maynard, supra note 132.
,36 Trade is Centerpiecebut LA Policy Remains on Hold Until Next Year, supra note 133.
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issues in accession negotiations have continued to stymie real progress. 7
However, President Clinton was prepared to ask Congress for a renewal of
fast-track authority in September 1997 as part of a renewed push for NAFTA
expansion and other trade deals.'
b. Mexico and Canada
As for the other NAFTA partners, some concerns have been raised about
Mexico's support of expansion. Mexico currently stands in an advantageous
position as the Latin American country with the most open access to the U.S.
market. The more this preferential access spreads through Latin America,
the more diluted the benefits become to Mexico.'39 However, Mexico has
denied any resistance to NAFTA expansion, pointing to its many bilateral
free trade agreements with Latin American countries 4 ° as proof of its
commitment to regional free trade. 1" Canada, on the other hand, has
publicly criticized the United States for not advancing the cause of
hemispheric free trade and NAFTA expansion more aggressively.'42
c. Latin American States
Although most Latin American countries welcome the possibility of
accession to NAFTA, political resistance does exist in several countries. The
most powerful country not waiting in line to join NAFTA is Brazil. Due to
the economic strength of MERCOSUR, Brazil enjoys a lucrative market in
the Southern Cone and may not be prepared to share it just yet. 43 Brazil's
plan is to consolidate and expand MERCOSUR, eventually creating a South
American free trade area which can negotiate with NAFTA as an equal.'"
7 Rupert Cornwell Washington, Chile gets the cold shoulder in Nafta bid, THE
INDEPENDENT - LONDON, Feb. 28, 1997.
3 Robert Russo, Canada to join Clinton in push for NAFTA expansion, THE ASSOCIATED
PRESS POLITICAL SERVICE, Sept. 1, 1997.
139 WEINTRAUB, supra note 6, at 90.
" Mexico has free trade agreements with Chile, Costa Rica, Columbia, and Venezuela.
Id. at 30.
141 O'Hop, supra note 7, at 151-52.
'
42 Id. at 152.
143 Trade is Centerpiecebut LA Policy Remains on Hold Until Next Year, supra note 133.
144 Brazil Get its Way: Inter-American Trade, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 30, 1996.
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Argentina, who once favored acceding to NAFTA independently, now
supports Brazil's plan to pursue free trade through MERCOSUR' 45
C. Evaluation of Candidates for Accession to NAFTA
1. Chile
a. Invitation and Negotiation
On December 12, 1994, the United States formally invited Chile to begin
negotiations to join NAFTA, thereby taking the first step toward expansion
of NAFTA and the creation of a FTAA.'46 On June 8, 1995, the parties
launched formal negotiations for accession, with the goal of reaching an
accord by early 1996.' However, in the months that followed, little
progress was made, due largely to a lack of political will by the U.S. Clinton
administration and resistance by the U.S. Congress to granting fast-track
authority for the negotiations. 4"
Chile, growing increasingly impatient with the lack of progress of the
negotiations, suspended talks on accession in late 1995 and turned instead to
MERCOSUR. In June of 1996 MERCOSUR and Chile formalized an
agreement that gives Chile an associate membership in MERCOSUR.'4 9
Significantly, though, the association agreement specifically allows Chile to
conclude other trade agreements, including membership in NAFTA, without
forfeiting its MERCOSUR status. 5 ' Not content even with this trade coup,
Chile also became a member of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC) and signed a framework agreement with the European Union.' 5'
141 Michael M. Phillips, Argentina Discards Separate Entry into NAFTA: Analyst,
EMERGING MARKETS REPORT, May 29, 1996, available in Westlaw, ALLNEWS PLUS
Database.
146 Cooper, supra note 63.
147 Leo Ryan, Talks Begin in Canada to Admit Chile into NAFTA, DENVER POST, June
8, 1995.
141 Maynard, supra note 132.
149 Chile Formalizes Agreement for Associate Membership in Southern Cone Common
Market,NOTISw-LATIN AMERICAN POLITICAL AFFAIRS, July 19, 1996, availablein Westlaw,
1996 WL 8089412.
150 Id.
15 Adrienne Fox, The Economy: Why Isn't Chile in NAFTA Yet? US. MissesOut Amid
Squabble, INVESTOR'S BUSINESS DAILY, Apr. 22, 1997.
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As part of its aggressive free-trade policy, however, Chile has not given
up on NAFTA. At the end of 1996, Chile signed a free-trade deal with
Canada that will erase tariffs on most of their bilateral commerce. The
treaty's basic terms mirror those of NAFTA, and the deal was intended to
help pave the way for Chilean accession to NAFTA.5 2 In February of
1997 the Chilean President, Eduardo Frei, addressed a joint session of the
U.S. Congress in an attempt to rejuvenate his country's bid to join NAFTA;
however, his speech did little to break the stalemate between opposing
factions over expansion.153
b. Reasons for Selection
The choice of Chile as the first country to be extended an invitation to
accede to NAFTA was based on political and practical considerations more
than economic considerations. Practically speaking, inviting Chile to join
avoided for the moment the issue of bloc versus individual accession."' 4
Politically, Chile was a perfect candidate for "locking-in" accession. After
the fall of the dictatorship of Pinochet, Chile returned to democracy and
began serious economic restructuring and reform.' 55 It has demonstrated
consistently solid economic policy and performance since, I"6 and is
arguably the most liberalized, market-oriented economy in Latin Ameri-
ca.15
7
However, the economic benefits to the current NAFTA members of
Chilean accession will be minimal. Chile is not a major trading partner of
the United States, ranking thirty-third among U.S. export destinations; it does
not share a common border with any NAFTA member, and it is not the
largest Latin American economy outside of Mexico. 8 Yet Chile was
152 Chile, Canada Sign Trade Pact; Inclusion in NAFTA Possible, Hous. CHRON., Dec.
6, 1996. Chile also signed a trade deal with Mexico. Supra note 151.
'" Washington, supra note 137.
"'
4O'Hop, supra note 7, at 153; although Chile's associate membership in MERCOSUR
makes this issue more complicated politically, the special clause in the agreement authorizing
Chile to join NAFTA simplifies the issue.
... WEINTRAUB, supra note 6, at 95-96.
156 id.
15' Ryan, supra note 147.
158 WEINTRAUB, supra note 6, at 95-96; however, the United States is Chile's largest
trading partner and its top investor, Maynard. Supra note 132.
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picked out as the first invitee almost from the beginning, and the hope is that
it will serve as a model for future accessions.' 59
2. MERCOSUR
Given Brazil's current plans for MERCOSUR, its accession to NAFTA in
the next several years seems unlikely. However, its role as the most
successful subregional association in Latin America 16 1 makes it the best
candidate for bloc accession, and it is very possible that either MERCOSUR
will accede to NAFTA as part of the creation of a FTAA, or NAFTA and
MERCOSUR as separate entities will form the basis for the FTAA.
16 1
Accession by MERCOSUR will entail all of the difficulties of merging two
associations discussed above. NAFTA covers a diversity of issues not
negotiated in MERCOSUR, while MERCOSUR contains rules concerning
types of integration not contemplated by NAFTA; reconciling these
differences will not be a simple task.
62
A basis for MERCOSUR membership in NAFTA exists in the "Four Plus
One" agreement between the United States and the four MERCOSUR
countries. Concluded in 1991, before the creation of NAFTA, its impetus
was the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative. 63 The agreement aims to
reduce barriers to trade, investment, and the flow of technology. 64 With
this agreement serving as a basis, the parties will have a head start on
accession negotiations. More recently, the United States and Canada have
indicated that they would be willing to discuss trade ties with MERCOSUR;
Mexico has expressed reservations about a formal dialogue, though, so it is
uncertain whether these discussions will occur under the auspices of
NAFTA.16
5
159 WEINTRAUB, supra note 6, at 95-96.
160 MERCOSUR represents almost 50% of Latin America's GDP, more than 40% of its
population, and about 33% of its foreign trade; intra-MERCOSUR trade is also growing
rapidly. Richard L. Bernal, Regional Trade Arrangements and the Establishment of a Free
Trade Area of the Americas, 27 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 945, 948 (1996).
161 MERCOSUR has plans to expand to include at least four more countries, and to
become what some are calling the South American Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA), an
apparent counterbalance to NAFTA. MERCOSUR Outdoing NAFTA, THE CHARLESTON
GAZETTE, Mar. 11, 1997.
162 De Aguinis, supra note 6, at 638.
1631 Id. at 635.
164 Id.
161 MERCOSUR May Add Bolivia, Venezuela, NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE &
INVESTMENT REPORT, July 15, 1996, available in Westlaw, 1996 WL 10175543.
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3. Other Prospects
Bloc accession to NAFTA by any of the other subregional associations,
CACM, CARICOM, or the Andean Pact, is a real possibility, but as of yet
there have been no discussions in that area. Other parties, however, have
made concrete overtures to NAFTA regarding their wishes to accede. In
May of 1996 the leaders of six Central American nations'66 visited Canada
in an attempt to persuade Canada that they were ready to join NAFTA.
Canadian officials stated that the time was not right for accession, as the
political momentum for expansion had lost steam in the United States, but
supported the region's hopes of developing closer political and economic ties
with Canada. 67
In February of 1996 U.S. President Clinton agreed to ask Congress to
grant Caribbean Basin nations trading rights similar to those of NAFTA by
giving them tariff breaks on certain categories of goods; this legislation
would serve as a first step in the process of preparing for accession to
NAFTA. 16 ' Then, in August of 1996, the tiny Caribbean nation of
Trinidad and Tobago explicitly stated that it wants to join NAFTA after
Chile completes its accession. 69 The country's government claimed that
it had met the criteria for membership by implementing tough economic
policies and signing free trade agreements; it also contended that the
economy of Trinidad and Tobago is complementary to the NAFTA
economies, and membership will demonstrate how small economies can
benefit from this type of trade agreement. 7 °
The U.S. response was lukewarm, however, as it prefers to negotiate
accession with CARICOM, of which Trinidad and Tobago is a member, as
a group. U.S. officials also stated that most Caribbean and Central American
states are far from meeting basic criteria for NAFTA membership.1 7' This
166 Nicaragua, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Belize. Howard
Williams, Canadian, Central American Leaders Hope to Push Ottawa on NAFTA Pact,
AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, May 16, 1996, available in Westlaw, 1996 WL 3854923.
6 7 Id.
168 The Region - NAFTA Parity for Caribbean Backed by Clinton, CARIBBEAN UPDATE,
Apr.1, 1996, available in Westlaw, 1996 WL 8153887.
169 Canute James, Trinidad and Tobago and the Big Leap: The Caribbean Nation Sees
Itself Ready to Join NAFTA Though the U.S. is Loath to Accept Members From the Region
Piecemeal, FIN. POST, Aug. 29, 1996.
170 id.
171 Id.
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statement indicates that the United States is serious about maintaining high
standards for membership and plans to be selective in who it supports for
accession to NAFTA.
V. CONCLUSION
Expansion of NAFTA through accession was a possibility from the day
of its creation, as is evidenced by Article 2204 of the agreement. However,
both the criteria and the method of accession were left to the discretion of
its members, and much uncertainty still exists in these areas. No official
criteria have yet been determined, but Latin American states understand that
they must implement economic reforms aimed at freer markets and freer
trade in order to join NAFTA. Whether expansion will occur by individual
or bloc accession, or a combination of both, will likely be determined as the
circumstances warrant. Both methods have important advantages and
disadvantages that must be considered.
Despite all the discussion of expansion, significant obstacles to accession
do exist. The growing strength and success of subregional associations in
Latin America creates multiple problems for accession. These include
domestic and group-oriented legal obstacles, the difficulties of absorbing
groups with different organizational and institutional structures, and the
potential conflicts created by overlapping and incompatible provisions.
Additionally, political obstacles threaten to get in the way of expansion. For
the moment, the United States has drawn back from actively supporting
expansion of NAFTA due to domestic political disagreements. Some
political resistance also exists in Latin America, but it is not widespread.
The question of who will accede to NAFTA is a wide open one. Chile is
the only state that has been formally invited to accede, and its accession has
stalled along with the push for expansion generally. MERCOSUR is
attracting increasing attention from NAFTA and from those involved in the
creation of the FTAA, and its role in hemispheric free trade should continue
to grow. Finally, many smaller Central American and Caribbean countries
have expressed serious interest in joining NAFTA, but as long as the
NAFTA members continue to insist on stringent admission criteria, accession
by most of these countries remains in the more distant future.
The Summit of the Americas and its plan for a Free Trade Area of the
Americas marked the beginning of anew era of both freer markets and freer
trade in Latin America and of closer economic and political ties between
Latin America and North America. NAFTA can be seen as both an impetus
[Vol. 26:615
1997] EXPANSION OF NAFTA 641
and a creation of this new era, and its future is closely intertwined with that
of the FTAA. But should the goal of hemispheric free trade not be reached
in the foreseeable future, NAFTA has a separate and independent basis for
its existence on which expansion will have no trouble resting.

